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Defectively Designed Highways
Steven J. Erlsten*
There are two basic design requirements in automobile safe-
ty: design to prevent traffic accidents and design to prevent
injuries when a crash occurs. The collision of automobiles is
foreseeable ... 1
HE ABOVE STATEMENT refers specifically to automobile design, but the
design principles that form the basis for this statement are equally
applicable to highway design. Although often ignored, the highway is a
member of a three component system that includes vehicle2 and driver.3
These individual and completely separate components must function to-
gether as a team each time a vehicle is put in motion, and a failure of any
one component is enough to cause an accident. However, it is a combi-
nation or chain of failures that often results in the increased severity of
an accident. 4
There are many design standards, attitudes, and procedures which
result in public highways with built-in design hazards and, when drivers
are confronted with these hazards, the highways involved become latent
killers. A defect of a highway by reason of its design will not be appar-
ent to those unfamiliar with the problems of highway engineering. Thus,
in the majority of accidents, the failing component is presumed to be the
driver and little further investigation or thought is given to other fac-
tors.5 Highway fatality statistics prove that the driver cannot sustain the
burden of correcting design shortcomings with driving skills, and an all-
out effort must be undertaken to place on all facets of highway travel
and design the same responsibility and safety standards now imposed on
drivers alone.8
* B.S./C.E. Valparaiso University; Third-year student at Cleveland-Marshall Law
School of Baldwin-Wallace College; Highway Structural Engineer with Howard,
Needles, Tammen and Bergendoff (Consulting Engineers); Former Highway Engineer
with California Division of Highways, 1963-64; Former part-time employment with
Ohio Highway Department and Indiana Highway Department 1960 and 1962; Regis-
tered E. I. T. State of Indiana.
1 Annot., 16 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 4 (1965).
2 See generally, Nader, Unsafe at Any Speed (New York, 1965).
3 Supra note 1.
4 For example see, Commonwealth, Department of Highways v. Compton, 387 S. W.
2d 314 (Ky. Ct. App. 1964); County of Pima v. Southern Pacific Company, 95 Ariz.
41, 386 P. 2d 400 (1963); Commonwealth, Department of Highways v. Begley, 376
S. W. 2d 295 (Ky. Ct. App. 1964).
5 See generally, Commonwealth, Department of Highways v. Compton, supra n. 4;
Morales v. New York State Thruway Authority, 47 Misc. 2d 153, 262 N. Y. S. 2d 173
(Ct. Cl. 1965).
6 See, New York World-Telegraph and Sun, The World Almanac and Book of Facts
for 1966 at 305 (81st Yr. of Issue); Automobile Manufacturers Association, Traffic
Deaths and Death Rates, 1935-1963, Automobile Facts & Figures 70 (1964 Edition).
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Personal Experiences
While working as an engineer for the California Division of High-
ways, the writer investigated a high accident area of a mountainous,
northern, coastal section of state highway. What was found and reported
was essentially the following: 7
1. A sharp downhill curve to the left;
2. A 90 foot drop to a river on the left;
3. A nearly vertical mountainside on the right with a maintenance
pullout area dug out of the mountain on the right and extending
about half way through the curve;
4. A superelevation s on the curve that reversed sharply at the
shoulder adjacent to the pullout.
It was observed that on a clear day about 90% of the vehicles com-
ing around this curve drifted to the right toward the pullout area. Then,
upon crossing the superelevation reversal,9 (see sketch), they were
lurched further to the right at which time the end of the pullout area
was reached and the vehicle was headed straight for the mountain side.
Faced with this situation, the startled driver would frantically "whip" his
steering wheel to the left in an effort to avoid crashing into the moun-
tainside. The superelevation reversal (on the outside shoulder) was now
recrossed and it acted like a dynamic catapult, thrusting the vehicle
toward the 90 foot drop into the river.
~~tjo Pavement Govl
-a -
This curve appeared very similar to thousands of others in the
vicinity, but it was different. It had an accident rate of about eight times
7 Calif. Div. of Highways, Div. I Traffic Dept., High Accident Area Report, filed by
Erlsten and Hathaway (1963).
8 Superelevation: raising or "banking" of the outside edge of a roadway curve to
compensate for the outward thrust of a vehicle as it travels around the curve.
9 Superelevation reversal: occurs when the roadway cross slope for the desired
curve banking reverses its direction and the outside edge of the curve is sloped or
"banked" toward the outside, rather than toward the inside, as is required for safety.
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that of the other similar areas on this section of highway.'0 A recom-
mendation was filed that at the very least a white line should be painted
along the right edge of the highway as a defining line to keep motorists
from crossing the superelevation reversal. The length of white line re-
quired was about fifty feet." Nothing was done except to let a non-
professional technician read the report and file it. The investigation was
made after a fatal plunge into the river on a foggy night by an unsus-
pecting motorist. With the rainy, foggy climate creating poor visibility
most of the year, it would seem that motorists deserve a well-defined
edge of highway rather than pigeon-hole filing of reports by non-profes-
sional people. Had this case come to trial, it can reasonably be said there
would have been no recovery. It probably would have been found that
any plans to correct the situation were matters of lawfully authorized
planning by a governmental body.'2 This, coupled with the rule that the
state is not the insurer of the safety of its highways, would surely have
barred the deceased driver from any recovery even though he was the
victim of a dangerous condition of which the state had actual knowledge
by reason of its own accident reports."
In another high accident area that was investigated and reported on
after a fatal accident, there was found to be practically no visibility of
approaching traffic due to trees and a massive bridge railing which tend-
ed to force motorists over a completely undefined center line where a
900 turn had to be negotiated. The center line was eventually marked as
recommended but nothing else was done because a new highway was
planned in about six years. 14 This, however, was of small consolation to
the woman who had just been killed and would obviously help no one
else for at least six years. A simple stop sign at the 900 turn for traffic
approaching the bridge would at least have slowed the traffic enough to
give warning of the surprise situation and, in addition, the situation de-
manded a much-improved curve warning sign system.'5
10 Calif. Div. of Highways, Div. I Traffic Dept., Calif. State Highway Patrol Accident
Records (1963).
11 See, Basile, Effect of Pavement Edge Markings on Traffic Accidents in Kansas,
Highway Research Board Bulletin 308, National Academy of Sciences-National Re-
search Council 80 (Pub'l. 938, 1961).
12 Natina v. Westchester County Park Commission, 49 Misc. 2d 573, 268 N. Y. S. 2d
414 (Sup. Ct. 1966); Zeppi v. State, 174 Cal. App. 2d 484, 345 P. 2d 33 (1959) (Negli-
gent highway shoulder condition caused accident, Gov't. immunity upheld); See
also, Prosser, Law of Torts 996 (3rd. Ed. 1964).
13 Morales v. New York State Thruway Authority, supra n. 5; Dupre v. Louisiana
Department of Highways, 154 So. 2d 579 (La. App. 1963); Newman v. U. S., 248 F.
Supp. 669 (D. D. C. 1965); Lidell v. State, 38 Misc. 2d 483, 236 N. Y. S. 2d 1005 (Ct.
Cl. 1963); Campbell v. South Carolina State Highway Dept., 244 S. C. 186, 135 S. E.
2d 838 (1964); Kelly v. Gifford, 63 Wash. 2d 221, 386 P. 2d 415 (1963); Kenyon v.
State, 21 A. D. 2d 851, 250 N. Y. S. 2d 1007 (1964).
14 Erlsten and Hathaway, op. cit. supra n. 7.
15 See, McCamment, New Kansas Curve Signs Reduce Deaths, 29 Traffic Engineer-
ing 14 (No. 5, 1959).
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The above situations are rather shocking, and the fact that the
grossly irresponsible attitudes and conduct of highway officials are often
supported by court decisions is tragic.10 The tragedy generally seems to
be not of the courts' own making, but rather one of omission by adver-
saries in failing to effectively argue the design defects as being blame-
worthy. This is true even though there are numerous publications by
authoritative sources which abound with realistic and practical safety
design features. The findings presented in these publications T are backed
by most convincing statistics and can be found in abundance at any tech-
nical library. These sources should not be overlooked by attorneys even
though they are being ignored by highway designers.
Some Cases on the Subject
In the case of Natina v. Westchester County Park Commission,1
8
there was a complete breakdown of two components. The driver of one
auto was drunk, speeding and completely irresponsible. The highway
design was in itself extremely hazardous. It had four ten-foot lanes
(twelve-foot lanes are standard) 19 and a 9' 650 foot curve (7 ° max-
imum is standard)_oo with no median barrier and inadequate supereleva-
tion and no warning signs. The drunk driver was killed and his passen-
ger injured when their car crossed the median and crashed head-on into
another auto. It is this other auto and its five dead passengers with
which this author is concerned. Highway designers cannot prevent drunk
drivers or speeding drivers from using the highways. However, it is eas-
ily within their realm to prevent crossover accidents by the proper de-
sign and placement of median dividers and not doing so on such a high-
way as the one involved in the above accident should make them equally
responsible for the deaths of innocent drivers and passengers. 21
16 For example see, Dupre v. Louisiana Dept. of Highways, supra n. 13; Lidell v.
State, supra n. 13; Morales v. New York State Thruway Authority, supra n. 5; Natina
v. Westchester County Park Commission, supra n. 12.
17 Supra, nn. 2, 11 and 15; Beaton and Field, Jr., Impact Tests, 30 Traffic Engineer-
ing 21 (No. 3 1959); Billion and Parsons, Median Accident Study-Long Island, New
York, Highway Research Board Bulletin 308, National Academy of Sciences-Na-
tional Research Council 64 (Pub'l. 938, 1961); Ehrman, Causes of Highway Accidents:
United States Experience, XII Traffic Quarterly 30 (No. 1, 1958); see generally, Traf-
fic & Transport Engineering, World Road News. (These are only examples and by
no means exhaustive of the sources available.)
Is Supra n. 12.
19 American Association of State Highway Officials, A Policy of Design of Rural
Highways-1965, 225 (1966).
20 Id. at 158.
21 Canons of Ethics for Engineers, Publication No. 1102, prepared by Engineers'
Council for Professional Development and adopted by National Society of Profes-
sional Engineers Oct. 28, 1946 ("Foreword .. .the engineer will discharge his duties
with fidelity to the public . . . It is his duty to interest himself in public welfare, and
(Continued on next page)
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In the Natina case, five innocent victims, including a safe, completely
law abiding driver would be alive if an engineer had used the foresight
appropriate to his enterprise. Instead, the built-in design hazards mate-
rialized and the failure of the highway component increased the severity
of the accident by five fatalities.
The decision states that "the drunk drivers acts are so irresponsible
that they preclude the poor highway design (no median barrier, no
curve warning signs, poor alignment, and inadequate superelevation) as
being proximate OR CONTRIBUTING causes of the accident." Most assuredly,
when these built-in design hazards materialized, they were at least equal-
ly contributing if not proximately to blame for the death of one entire
family of five.
Morales v. New York State Thruway Authority,22 a wrongful death
action, was dismissed on the grounds that the claimant failed to sustain
the burden of proof. The accident occurred on a high-speed thruway
which had no dividers between lanes to prevent crossover. The pave-
ment composition changed on a curve without warning and the victim's
car skidded in a rain storm and crossed the median. Perhaps the claim-
ant would have had an accident even with proper design and provision
of a lane divider, but surely with this design the accident could have
been limited to a "fender-bender," rather than the fatal accident that
occurred. The failure of a design to provide for life-saving median bar-
riers should be taken as evidence of negligent design in most accidents
involving crossover. With all of the technical reports and statistical find-
ings available, it should be prima facia evidence in a crossover accident
that the highway authority was contributorily negligent in their failure
to provide a properly designed guard rail.23 In Morales, however, the
court said that the plaintiff failed to prove that the state had maintained
a dangerous highway through improper construction and maintenance.
In the total absence of a median barrier, the basis for this decision seems
questionable. The court cannot be greatly criticized, however, since the
statistics and expert opinions presented in the case were somewhat min-
imal in regard to the plaintiff's claims, and to one non-technically orient-
ed, highway design defects are for the most part unascertainable. Also,
highway engineers who would qualify as experts in the field are ulti-
mately employed by the State, which is responsible for final designs and
(Continued from preceding page)
to be ready to apply his special knowledge for the benefit of mankind. Canon 4. He
will have due regard for the safety of life and health of public and employees who
may be affected by the work for which he is responsible"). Incorporated Village of
Flower Hill v. State, 8 Misc. 2d 679, 168 N. Y. S. 2d 89 (Ct. Cl. 1957) (Village dam-
aged by wash-out due to inadequate design of highway drainage system. Court's
opinion, p. 93 "State . . . has a duty in its maintenance of highways to guard against
such dangers as could or ought to have been anticipated or foreseen in the exercise
of reasonable prudence and care").
22 Supra, n. 5.
23 Beaton and Field, Jr., op. cit. supra n. 17; Billion and Parsons, op. cit. supra n. 17.
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safety standards. This creates an automatic censorship of criticism and
a non-disclosure in the court room or elsewhere of design shortcomings. 24
There is also a hesitancy on the part of most engineers to accept the
fatally-proven fact that the designs which neatly fit the formulas and
standards are in reality unsafe.25
In the case of Dupre v. Louisiana Department of Highways, 26 the
problem technically presented is not one of highway design, but actually
one of maintenance. However, the attitudes outlined and the results
reached provide dramatic examples of highway deficiencies and the lack
of pressure for corrective measures. There was a large hole in the road-
way that was left unrepaired for a long period of time. It was necessary
for the injured plaintiff to travel this road in his daily routine. The plain-
tiff struck the hole and the accident occurred which resulted in his seri-
ous injury. The court denied recovery because the plaintiff had known
that the public highway was dangerous and was, therefore, contribu-
torily negligent. This decision would make everyone except the most
naive driver contributorily negligent, for we are all aware of the acci-
dents and deaths occurring on our highways.
The well-developed rule the court supposedly followed in the Dupre
case was essentially the following: The Department of Highways is liable
for damages caused by highway defects which are sufficiently dangerous
to cause accident and injury to persons using the highway in a reason-
ably prudent manner if the Department has actual or constructive notice
of the defect.27 The state, however, is deemed to know of its own acts.28
Nevertheless, the court in the Dupre case cited the rule and then denied
recovery, saying in effect that there had been contributory negligence
for use of the public highway.29 This decision seems most rigid. Espe-
cially in view of the fact that an abutting landowner probably would
have been found liable for damages in a like situation."
Although the rationale of the decisions is often framed in terms of
structural defects the pleadings reflect a lack of well developed argu-
24 See also, National Society of Professional Engineers, Can Engineers in Industry
Be Professional?, American Engineer 22 (Sept. 1966); See generally, Dowen v. State,
11 Misc. 2d 555, 174 N. Y. S. 2d 849 (Ct. Cl. 1958), (Contradicting results of a "Ball
Bank Test" were presented by claimant. Court's opinion, "All things being equal,
the Court is bound to accept the test made by the State, since it was made by the
very experts the State employs for just such tests").
25 Supra n. 6.
26 Supra n. 13.
27 Doremus v. Incorporated Village of Lynbrook, 25 A. D. 2d 749, 269 N. Y. S. 2d 55
(1966); Commonwealth, Department of Highways v. Higdon, 383 S. W. 2d 331 (Ky.
Ct. App. 1964); Newman v. U. S., supra n. 13; Kelly v. Gifford, supra n. 13.
28 Coakley v. State, 26 Misc. 2d 431, aff'd. 15 A. D. 2d 721, 222 N. Y. S. 2d 1023 (1962).
29 Lidell v. State, supra n. 13; Morales v. New York State Thruway Authority, supra
n. 5; Natina v. Westchester County Park Commission, supra n. 12; Bernal v. Clifton,
77 N. J. Super. 481, 187 A. 2d 22 (Super. Ct. A. D. 1962).
30 Prosser, op. cit. supra n. 12, at 359; for example, Greenberg v. F. W. Woolworth
Co., 18 Misc. 2d 141, 186 N. Y. S. 2d 303 (Sup. Ct. 1959).
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ments that would be necessary in order to sway the court from the pre-
sumption that the driver is always wrong and totally liable. This failure
to present a strong case has created a great void in the decisions of high-
way accident cases. This void can and must be filled if the social frus-
tration and destruction created by unsafe highways are ever to end.
The recent passage by Congress of the "Highway Safety Act of
1966" 31 and the events leading up to its passage seem to indicate that
the general public is becoming educated to the fact that our highway net-
work is a tri-partite integrally related system. When this public aware-
ness becomes a full realization, the greatest obstacle in the way of filling
the void will have been overcome, and the existing and future technical
and statistical findings will become acceptable evidence to the general
public. Then, hopefully, pressures of public opinion will force changes in
highway designs and court decisions.
Technical Findings and Comparisons
The Kansas Highway Commission reduced the fatality rate through
"left-road-at-curve" accidents by 43% .32 They did this through color,
size, and placement of signs as determined by thorough studies and the
attitude of "make the sign find the driver" instead of the reverse. Would
the six dead people from the Natina and Morales cases have been among
the 43% saved? In those cases, there were no signs at all!
The California Division of Highways conducted tests on median
guard rails and determined several designs which would not only prevent
crossover but also minimize the deflection of the crashing vehicle back
into the stream of traffic.33 In Natina and Morales there were no guard
rails at all!
A compilation of the "before and after" effect of pavement edge
markings showed a 59% decrease in fatalities on Kansas highways.
3 4
This finding was reported in January, 1961. Perhaps the fatality in Cali-
fornia that was investigated in August, 1963,35 would have been among
the 59% saved if the edge of roadway had been marked. It would at
least seem feasible that in two and one half years desirable safety fea-
tures would become known to all highway departments.
Economic necessity is usually the excuse given for poor and danger-
ous highway design. When guard rails, warning signs, and edge mark-
ings are decreased or eliminated, the money saved can be used to stretch
out a few more miles of pavement. Time is another excuse given. The
time saved by elimination of these items is used to meet tight completion
31 80 Stat. 731 (Public Law 89-564).
32 McCamment, op. cit. supra, n. 15, at 14.
33 Beaton and Field, Jr., op. cit. supra, n. 17, at 21.
34 Basile, op. cit. supra, n. 11, at 84.
35 Erlsten and Hathaway Report, supra n. 7.
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dates. In 1955, which just preceded the years of the big national push
for completion of the interstate system, the National Safety Council set
the cost of highway accidents at $4.5 billion.3 How many miles of safety
features would that have provided?
There are several points to be drawn from the graphic examples fur-
nished by crossover accidents.
1. There is no guard rail in existence that will completely eliminate
accidents.
2. The only function of a guard rail is to reduce the severity of an
accident.
3. A guard rail incorporated as a median barrier must prevent
crossover in order to reduce severity.
4. Severity is reduced because additional innocent vehicles are
eliminated from involvement in potential crossover accidents.
The crossover accident in the Natina case happened in 1958 and the
opinion issued by the court in 1966 stated that the poor highway design
was precluded from being considered a PROXIMATE OR CONTRIBUTING
CAUSE of the accident. Compare this 1966 statement with the 1961 find-
ing presented in a study made on the very same Westchester County
Parkways where the accident occurred.
"The installation of the double faced type of guide rail median
on the Cross County Parkway reduced the reported total accident
frequency by about one-third... Fatal, head-on and sideswipe in the
opposite direction WERE ELIMINATED. ." 37
Compare the National Standards published in 1961 for shoulder
delineation with the 1963 practice of unmarked shoulders followed in
coastal Northern California where rain and fog created extremely poor
visibility most of the year.
"The through traffic lanes and the shoulder area should be
clearly defined at all times, particularly at night or in inclement
weather when visibility is poor." 38
Compare the question of the two Ohio and California Highway prac-
tices. Why does California see fit to install elaborate ultra-modern com-
36 Ehrman, op. cit. supra, n. 17, at 31.
37 Billion, Taragin, and Cross, Effect of Parkway Median on Driver Behavior-
Westchester County Parkways, Highway Research Board Bulletin 308, National
Academy of Sciences-National Research Council 62 (Pub'l. 938, 1961).
38 National Joint Committee on Uniform Traffic Control Devices, which is comprised
of the following: American Association of State Highway Officials, Institute of Traffic
Engineers, National Committee on Uniform Traffic Laws and Ordinances, National
Association of County Officials, American Municipal Association, Manual on Uniform
Traffic Control Devices for Streets and Highways, U. S. Dept. of Commerce (June,
1961) p. 128; Compare ... with . .. , E.g., The Ohio Dept. of Highways Div. of Opera-
tions Bureau of Traffic, Ohio Manual of Uniform Traffic Control Devices for Streets
and Highways (1963), p. 176 ("Solid white lines are used for guide lines where the
line may not ordinarily be crossed at the discretion of the driver or where crossing
of the line is to be discouraged").
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puterized traffic signal systems but still refuse to delineate the edge of
the roadway? Why does Ohio delineate the pavement edge but refuse
to install automatic traffic signal systems?
Generally, what grounds constitute negligence in other fields of law
when the safety standards dictated are clearly transgressed? Also, in
the interest of social preservation, how long can the inequities of govern-
mental immunity be adhered to?3
9
Patent v. Latent
A patent highway defect can "speak for itself" and be readily under-
stood while a latent defect "speaks" as a subtle con-artist to unsuspect-
ing victims. The problem is that a patent defect is nearly always a main-
tenance question even though the defect was the result of an inadequate
or erroneous design. Thus, there are relatively few if any cases decided
on the merits of the designs alone and most cases decided favorably for
injured plaintiffs involve one and usually more of the following:
1. inadequate or missing highway signs,
40
2. collapsed or washed out areas of the highway (caused by poor
design or lack of maintenance) 4
3. poor or faulty initial construction (same effect as lack of main-
tenance) .42
Summary
The safety of travel on our highways is dependent upon the way
that the three components of driver, vehicle, and highway interact with
each other. Every structural plan should be designed to prevent traffic
accidents and to minimize injury once an accident occurs. There are cer-
tain obvious safety standards such as the provision of median barriers,
center stripes, and edge delineations, the violation of should be deemed
negligence per se.
Highway accidents are foreseeable and once a built-in hazard mate-
39 See generally, Lawyer, Birth and Death of Governmental Immunity, 15 Clev.-
Mar. L. Rev. 529 (1966).
40 Commonwealth, Department of Highways v. Begley, supra n. 4; Kenyon v. State,
supra n. 13; Citron v. Nassau County, 49 Misc. 2d 928, 268 N. Y. S. 2d 909 (1966);
Robinson v. State, 38 Misc. 2d 229, 237 N. Y. S. 2d 601 (Ct. Cl. 1962); Commonwealth,
Department of Highways v. Higdon, supra n. 27; McCormick v. State, 5 Misc. 2d 582,
161 N. Y. S. 2d 666 (Ct. Cl. 1957); Schneider v. Yakima County, 65 Wash. 2d 352, 397
P. 2d 411 (1965).
41 Campbell v. South Carolina State Highway Department, supra n. 13; Buffington v.
State, 2 Misc. 2d 496, 152 N. Y. S. 2d 716 (Ct. Cl. 1956); Incorporated Village of
Flower Hill v. State, supra n. 21; Hogg v. Department of Highways of the State, 80
So. 2d 182 (La. App. 1955); Campbell v. State of New York, 18 Misc. 2d 947, 189
N. Y. S. 2d 753 (Ct. Cl. 1958).
42 Campbell v. South Carolina State Highway Dept., supra n. 13; Buffington v. State,
supra n. 41; Incorporated Village of Flower Hill v. State, supra n. 21; Hogg v. De-
partment of Highways, supra n. 41; Campbell v. State of New York, supra n. 41;
Commonwealth, Department of Highways v. Begley, supra n. 4; Clokessy v. State, 11
Misc. 2d 952, 173 N. Y. S. 2d 835 (Ct. Cl. 1958).
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rializes, the claim that the hazard was not foreseen should not be avail-
able to one who did not use foresight appropriate to his enterprise. Thus,
the people chiefly responsible for designed-in highway safety, the high-
way designers themselves, should act first to upgrade their design stand-
ards and requirements to compensate more readily for the shortcomings
of drivers and vehicles.43 The defense of assumption of risk should not
be available to one who has failed to warn an innocent victim of the risk.
Likewise, the defense of contributory negligence should not be a shield
to negligent highway departments through the claim that the plaintiff
knew public highways were dangerous.44 However, it should be noted
that the liability of a governmental unit as regards highways is deter-
mined by statute and each state's code should be consulted to determine
the extent and proof required.45
There are cases involving unsafe highways where recoveries have
been granted. However, these involved blatantly patent defects and the
pure design aspect of highways has been relatively free from exami-
nation. With this in mind, a general analysis of existing cases can be
made. Under the surface, there appears to be a split over social and
economic principles rather than basic legal principles. One view seems
to be result-oriented in denying even in the most extreme cases a recov-
ery against the state.46 The other view seems to apply a more humane
attitude in granting recovery where there is culpable negligence by the
state.47 The first view seems to be based on the reasoning that it pre-
serves the state's revenue, while the second apparently is based on an
increasing public concern as to the safety of the highways. The second
line of reasoning appears to be on the increase and will probably become
predominant as the general public becomes more aware and more de-
manding of the social benefits created by safe highway design and main-
tenance.
48
This author would recommend at least a partial res ipsa loquitur49
attitude by the courts when highway designs are of questionable safety.
For example, in inadequate highway sign situations the courts should
43 See, Pomeroy, The Third Killer: The Highway Itself, The Plain Dealer, Sept. 11,
1966, p. 1, col. 1.
44 See, Dupre v. Louisiana Department of Highways, supra n. 13.
45 Ohio Const. Art. I, Sec. 16 (Action against state); Ohio Rev. Code 5501.18 (Ac-
tions against Director of Highways); See also, Lawyer, op. cit. supra, n. 39.
46 Nev. Const. Art. 4, Sec. 22; Hardgrave v. State, 80 Nev. 74, 389 P. 2d 249 (1964)
(State immune from liability for negligence in regard to highways); But see, Rice v.
Clark County, 79 Nev. 253, 382 P. 2d 605 (1963) (Immunity does not extend to
county).
47 Supra nn. 40, 41, 42 and 45.
48 Supra n. 31; But see, 112 Cong. Rec. A4793 (daily ed. Sept. 13, 1966) (extension of
remarks of Senator Rosenthal on Highway Safety Act of 1966) (Safety of the high-
way itself or its design was not once mentioned).
49 See, Black, Law Dictionary 1470 (4th ed. 1951); Prosser, op. cit. supra n. 12, at 215;
See generally, Robinson v. State, supra n. 40.
10https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol16/iss2/7
274 16 CLEV-MAR. L. R. (2) May, 1967
adopt a strict principle that, to adequately warn of a hazardous highway
condition, a sign's message and location must relate to the danger in such
a manner as to give adequate warning thereof.50 Developments such as
this will require a relaxing of the view that the frequent culpable negli-
gence exhibited by designs must be shown to be the proximate cause of
the accident before recovery is allowed. 51 This, however, requires a
changing of public opinion and a realization that the driver is not always
wrong.
50 Commonwealth, Department of Highways v. Higdon, supra n. 27; McDevitt v.
State, 1 N. Y. 2d 540, 154 N. Y. S. 2d 874, 136 N. E. 2d 845 (1956).
51 For example, Bertram v. State, 282 App. Div. 415, 123 N. Y. S. 2d 175, affd. 306
N. Y. 913, 119 N. E. 2d 600 (1953); Wesley v. State of New York, 272 App. Div. 990, 72
N. Y. S. 2d 772 (1947).
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